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NOTE

VULNERABLE AND INADEQUATELY
PROTECTED: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT,
INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS, AND THE
LAWS THAT FAIL TO PROTECT
I.

INTRODUCTION

"About seven hundred, eight hundred"l-that is the number of days
Kalief Browder remembered being in solitary confinement.2 For three
years, Browder was incarcerated at New York City's Rikers Island jail
("Rikers Island") 3 before the Bronx District Attorney's Office informed
the Bronx criminal court that it did not have sufficient evidence to
proceed to trial. 4 When Browder's brother would visit him at Rikers
Island, he noticed that Browder became thinner and depressed following
his time in solitary confinement.5 After two years of pretrial detention,
Browder's despair increased, and he attempted to hang himself while in
1. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law.
2. Id.; Byron Pitts et al., Who Kalief Browder Might Have Been if He Hadn't Spent over
1,000 Days in Jail Without a Conviction, ABC NEWS (June 17, 2015, 6:54 PM), http://abcnews.go.
com/US/kalief-browder-spent-1000-days-jail-charges/story?id=31832313 ("By the time Browder's
case was dismissed in June 2013, prison records show he... had spent 1,100 days behind bars,
more than 800 of those were in solitary.").
3. Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers Island for
Three Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TMES (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3 -years-without-trial-commitssuicide.html?action=click&contentCollection=Heath&modue=ReatedCverage&region=MarginaI
ia&pgtype=article ("Though he never stood trial or was found guilty of any crime, [Browder] spent
three years at [Rikers Island], nearly two of them in solitary confinement.").
4. Gonnerman, supra note 1. In May 2010, Browder was arrested and charged with robbery,
grand larceny, and assault. Id. Because Browder was on probation as a youthful offender at the time
of the arrest, Browder was remanded back to Rikers Island until he could post $3000 in bail, an
amount that his family could not afford. Id. In May 2013, three years and over thirty court dates
later, the prosecution dismissed the case because the complainant, the prosecution's only source of
evidence, moved to Mexico. Id. As a result, the prosecution conceded that they would not be able to
meet the burden of proof to proceed with the case. Id.; see also Schwirtz & Winerip, supra note 3
(noting that the charges against Browder were dropped).
5. See Gonnerman, supranote 1.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 13

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 45:263

solitary confinement.6 Browder returned to solitary confinement after a
visit to the jail's clinic, and all but a plastic bucket was removed from
his cell.7 Weeks later, Browder tried8 to use broken and sharpened pieces
of the plastic bucket to cut his wrist.

Over a year later, Browder's charges were dismissed, and he was
finally released; six months later, Browder made another attempt to take
his life. 9 Despite his adamant attempts to reintegrate--earning his GED,
enrolling in community college, securing a job, and attending weekly
counseling sessions-he was unable to overcome "the side effects from
what happened in there." 10 And, as his time post-release progressed, his
"flashbacks to that time [were] becoming more frequent.""1 In a postrelease interview, Browder stated: "Prior to going to jail, I never had any
mental illness ....I never tried to kill myself, I never had any thoughts
like that.' 2 Browder's experience at Rikers Island fatally changed
him, and in 2015, Browder's mother went outside their home to
investigate a loud thud and found Browder hanged himself from his
bedroom window. 3
Recent reports and filed complaints demonstrate that Browder's
experience at Rikers Island was not an anomaly. 14 Individuals with
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. See id; see also Pitts
et al., supra note 2 (explaining "prison records show [that Browder]
had attempted suicide at least six times" during his time at Rikers Island).
9. Gonnerman, supranote 1.
10. Id; see Mark Berman, KaliefBrowder and What We Do and Don 't Know About Solitary
Confinement in the US., WASH. POST (June 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/06/09/kalief-browder-and-what-we-do-and-dont-know-about-solitary-confinementin-the-u-s/?utm term=.00ac31Ocadef ("'After fighting so hard to get out of jail.., he ultimately
was unable to overcome his own pain and torment which emanated from his experiences in solitary
confinement,' Browder's family said in a statement.").
11. Gonnerman, supranote 1.
12. Dana Ford, Man Jailed as Teen Without Conviction Commits Suicide, CNN (June 15,
2015, 4:49 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/07/us/kalief-browder-dead.
13. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993-2015, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015; Schwirtz & Winerip, supra
note 3.
14. See, e.g., JAMES GILLIGAN & BANDY LEE, REPORT TO THE NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF
CORRECTION 3 (Sept. 5, 2013) (assessing whether identified New York City correctional facilities
were complying with the Mental Health Minimum Standards, Dr. Gilligan and Dr. Lee found a rise
in the use of solitary confinement). In 2012 and 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") also
conducted an investigation at Rikers Island to determine whether the New York City Department of
Corrections and Community Services violated any rights of its incarcerated persons. U.S. ATT'Y
FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIPA INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION JAILS ON RIKERS ISLAND 1, 2 (Aug. 4, 2014). The DOJ concluded
that the "[Department of Corrections] relies far too heavily on punitive segregation as a disciplinary
measure, placing adolescent inmates-many of whom are mentally ill-in what amounts to solitary
confinement at an alarming rate and for excessive periods of time." Id.at 3. Even though this
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mental illness 15 are disproportionately represented in jails and prisons,16
and incarcerated longer than individuals without mental illness.
Similarly, individuals with mental illness are also disproportionately
represented in solitary confinement-accounting for approximately onequarter to one-half of individuals in solitary confinement. 17 Several
federal laws aim to protect incarcerated individuals and people with
mental illness. 18 Despite these efforts, however, this population
continues to be exposed to increased risk when subjected to solitary
confinement. 19 Because "U.S. courts are, in general, deferential to the
have
permitted lax
decisions and policies of administrators, ,,20 courts hv
•• 21
standards when assessing the legality of prison conditions.
This Note begins by examining the extent to which individuals with
mental illness are subjected to and affected by solitary confinement. 22 It
also elucidates the current laws that seemingly create protections yet
further the problem.23 Moreover, this Note proposes three different
approaches that seek to adequately protect individuals with mental
investigation narrowly focused on incarcerated adolescents, the report noted that the findings
indicate the violations that occurred with that population, also occurred "in equal measure" with
other populations. Id.
15. For the purposes of this Note, the general definition of mental illness is as follows:
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an
individual's cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning.
Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability in social,
occupational, or other important activities.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 20 (5th

ed. 2013).
16. See infra Part 11.B; see also Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and
Prison Rules, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 401 (2006) ("Because misconduct records can lead
to loss of any accumulated 'good time,' prisoners with mental illness tend to serve most or all of
their maximum sentences. For example, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections reports that
prisoners with serious mental illness are three times as likely as other prisoners to serve their
maximum sentence. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, mentally ill prisoners in state
prison serve more time on average than other prisoners." (footnote omitted)).
17. See Fellner, supra note 16, at 402-03; see also GILLIGAN & LEE, supra note 14, at 3
(noting that forty-one percent of the individuals in solitary confinement at Rikers Island's Central
Punitive Segregation Unit are mentally ill).
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See infra Part l.B.
20. Tracy Hresko, Article, In the Cellars of the Hollow Men: Use of Solitary Confinement in
U.S.Prisonsand Its Implications Under InternationalLaws Against Torture, 18 PACE INT'L L. REV.
1, 15 (2006); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983) ("We have repeatedly said both
that prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they
manage and that lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected liberty
interests.").
21. See infra text accompanying note 203.
22. See infra Part 1l.
23. See infra Part III.
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illness who are placed in solitary confinement.24 As such, Part II of this
Note defines solitary confinement and discusses its history, prevalence,
and impact, both in general and with respect to individuals with mental
illness. 25 Part III examines the current legal landscape, both
internationally and domestically.2 6 Part III also elucidates the way in
which U.S. laws significantly fail to protect individuals with mental
illness.27 Considering these shortcomings, Part IV proposes federal
legislation that should be adopted to adequately protect this population
and ensure uniformity.28 More specifically, Part IV identifies three
different legal approaches that aim to better protect individuals in
solitary confinement. 29 Additionally, Part IV recommends ways in
which the legal approaches can be modified to better protect individuals
with mental illness in solitary confinement.3 ° President Barack Obama
noted in January 2016 that "[t]he United States is a nation of
second chances, but the experience of solitary confinement too often
undercuts that second
chance., 31 This Note proposes ways to restore that
32
chance.
second
II.

SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: HISTORY AND IMPACT

Solitary confinement has been a part of American correctional
systems for approximately two centuries. 33 Throughout this time, its use
has fluctuated and been studied and critiqued.3 4 Since its inception,
researchers have observed negative psychological effects in individuals
subjected to solitary confinement.35 Such effects have been particularly
detrimental on individuals with mental illness.3 6 As the prison
population increased and the number of community-based mental health
facilities decreased, the prevalence of individuals with mental illness in
prisons increased disproportionately. 37 Moreover, as the number of
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part I.
26. See infra Part HI.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part V.
31. Barack Obama, Barack Obama: Why We Must Reform Solitary Confinement, WASH.
POST (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-why-we-mustrethink-solitary-confinementl2016/01/25/29a361 f2-c384-11 e5-8965-0607e0e265ce story.html.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Part l.A.
34. See infra Part H.A.
35. See infra Part I.A.
36. See infra Part l.B.
37. See infra Part I.B.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss1/13

4

Campbell: Vulnerable and Inadequately Protected: Solitary Confinement, Indi

2016]

VULNERABLE AND INADEQUA TEL YPROTECTED

solitary-confinement-eligible infractions increased, the number of
individuals with mental illness in solitary confinement increased
disproportionately as well.38 Although the factors that drive this
disproportionate representation vary,39 what remains rather consistent
are the long-term deleterious effects of solitary confinement.4 °
A. Rise, Decline, and Resurgence
Aiming to encourage repentance and reformation, 41 solitary
confinement began in the United States in the early 1800s when two
systems of incarceration-Philadelphia and Auburn-emerged.4 2 The
Philadelphia system, which originated in a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
correctional facility, isolated incarcerated persons throughout their
respective sentences.43 Incarcerated persons were confined to their
individual cells and speaking to others-fellow incarcerated persons
or prison officials-was prohibited. 44 Utilizing a similar concept,
the Auburn system, which originated in an Auburn, New York
correctional facility, allowed incarcerated persons to work with fellow
incarcerated persons, but they were required to do so in complete
silence.45 Mirroring the way in which the United States confined its
incarcerated persons, some European nations followed suit and adopted
the Philadelphia system.4 6

38. See infra Part ll.B.
39. See infra Part ll.B.
40. See infra Partll.B.
41. See Juan E. Mendez (Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur
of the Human Rights Council On Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 23, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011) ("The practice can be traced to the 1820s in
the United States of America, where it was believed that isolation of prisoners would aid in their
rehabilitation."); Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates. A
Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 456-57 (2006); Elizabeth
Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement and InternationalHuman Rights: Why the U.S. Prison System
Fails Global Standards,21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 71, 73 (2005); Hresko, supra note 20, at 6.
42. See Joseph B. Allen, Note, Extending Hope into "The Hole": Applying Graham v. Florida
to Supermax Prisons, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 217, 220 (2011); see also United States v.
Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 449 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that prior to the Philadelphia
system, incarcerated persons were sentenced to hard labor).
43. Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
325, 328 (2006); Smith, supranote 41, at 456.
44. See Smith, supra note 41, at 456.
45. Id.at 456.
46. Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council On Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment, supra note 41, 23 ("Beginning in
the 1830s, European and South American countries adopted this practice."); Grassian, supra note
43, at 328; Smith, supranote 41, at 457.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 13

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 45:263

Within decades, however, solitary confinement's deleterious effects
on incarcerated people became apparent.4 7 Studies showed that
incarcerated people placed in solitary confinement suffered from
"hallucinatory, paranoid, and confusional psychosis characterized by
vivid hallucinations, dissociative tendencies, agitation, aimless violence,
and delusions. 48 Individuals who did not have prior mental illness also
exhibited these symptoms following time in solitary confinement.49
In light of these findings and the Supreme Court's 1890 holding in
In re Medley,50 where the Court commented on solitary confinement's
harmful effects, 5 solitary confinement was used less frequently in the
United States.52 In 1983, following a federal prison riot in Marion,
Illinois, however, solitary confinement resurged.53 Under the "Marion
Model,, 54 incarcerated persons are subjected to "long-term, oftentimes
indefinite, disciplinary segregation in which [they] are placed in
virtually total isolation and severely restricted in their movements. 55
The Marion Model shifted solitary confinement's purpose from
reformative to punitive, and it is the prevalent model today in American
prisons.56 As prison populations grew and prisons became increasingly

47. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890); Vasiliades, supranote 41, at 78 ("Between 1854
and 1909, thirty-seven articles published in German journals collectively delineated hundreds of
cases of psychoses linked to conditions of imprisonment.").
48. Vasiliades, supra note 41, at 78 (noting that the studies failed to show the direct cause of
these ailments, but solitary confinement was "specifically cited as responsible for precipitating the
psychosis"); see also Grassian, supra note 43, at 328-29 (describing the symptoms that individuals
subjected to solitary confinement exhibited).
49. See Grassian, supranote 43, at 329.
50. 134 U.S. 160.
51. Id. at 168. After petitioner was sentenced to death for murdering Ellen Medley, Colorado
enacted a statute requiring individuals awaiting execution to be placed in solitary confinement. See
id. at 161-62. Petitioner did not dispute the conviction but challenged whether the solitary
confinement law applied to him ex post facto. See id. at 162. After discussing solitary confinement's
irreparable harm, the Court held that the Constitution barred Colorado from applying this statute ex
post facto. See id at 168, 175. Moreover, in the decision, the Court specifically addressed solitary
confinement noting that its purpose was to be a "just punishment of the worst crimes of the human
race." Id. at 169-70.
52. See Allen, supra note 42, at 220.
53. Id. at 221. The Marion correctional facility was created in 1963. Vasiliades, supra note
41, at 74. It sought to modify coercive behavior by isolating individuals for up to twenty-two hours
a day, limiting their ability to participate in any rehabilitative programs. Id. Following the riot,
prison officials placed all of Marion's incarcerated persons in solitary confinement indefinitely.
Allen, supra note 42, at 221.
54. Hresko, supranote 20, at 8.
55. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment
Analysis of Imposing ProlongedSupermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a Mental Illness,
90 DENV. U. L. REv. 1, 14 (2012).
56. See Hresko, supra note 20, at 7-8 (discussing the way in which many of the solitary
confinement units now follow the Marion Model).
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overcrowded-a consequence of mandatory sentencing, longer
sentences, and harsher punishments for low-level offenses-solitary
confinement became more prevalent. 7
Today, solitary confinement is known by many namessegregation, supermax, Secure Housing Unit ("SHU"), Special Housing
Unit, the hole, the box, administrative segregation, isolation, lockdown,
or the bing, to name a few.5 8 Similarly, the justifications for its use also
vary.5 9 Moving away from its reformative roots, 60 solitary confinement
is used to ensure the mental stability of incarcerated persons, 61 "to
isolate prisoners who pose a threat to the safety and security of the
prison, ' 62 to isolate individuals who are at risk of violence within the
general population,6 3 and to punish.64 Solitary confinement is used as
punishment for a variety of infractions. 65 For example, solitary
confinement can be used for technical offenses such as "failure to keep a
tidy cell, wasting food, or littering.', 66 During a twenty-one month-long
investigation at Rikers Island, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ")
noted that for the adolescent population, many of the infractions that
yielded time in solitary confinement were for non-violent offenses. 67
Despite its differing names, reasons for use, and warranting
infractions, solitary confinement conditions remain rather consistent. 68
Aiming to bar those incarcerated from human contact, 69 solitary
confinement isolates an incarcerated person from other incarcerated
persons, 70 confining the person to a cell for twenty-three to twenty-four
57. See Vasiliades, supra note 41, at 75 ("Under current prison practices, virtually all inmates
from death row or the general population will spend time in segregation."); see also id. (describing
the factors that contribute to prison overcrowding).
58. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 504 (2011); Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights
Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment, supranote

41,

26; Vasiliades, supra note 41, at 73-74; Jacob Zoghlin, Article, Punishments in Penal

Institutions: (Dis)-Proportionality in Isolation, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2014, at 24, 24;

Gonnerman, supra note 1.
59. See Vasiliades, supra note 41, at 74.
60. Hresko, supranote 20, at 7.
61. Vasiliades, supra note 41, at 74.
62. Zoghlin, supranote 58, at 25.
63.
64.

See id.
See Vasiliades, supra note 41, at 73-74.

65. Zoghlin, supranote 58, at 25.
66. Id.
67. See U.S. ATT'Y FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., supra note 14, at 49 (noting that the most
common infractions included "failure to obey orders from staff (1,671 infractions), verbally
harassing or abusing staff (561 infractions), [and] failure to obey orders promptly and entirely (713
infractions)").
68. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text; infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
69. SeeIn re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).
70.

SAL RODRIGUEZ,

SOLITARY WATCH, FACT SHEET: PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF
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hours out of the day.71 Moreover, individuals in solitary confinement are
typically detained "in a windowless cell no larger than a typical parking
spot for 23 hours a day; and in the one hour when he leaves it, he likely
is allowed little or no opportunity for conversation or interaction with
anyone. 72 When incarcerated individuals have interaction with others,
however, it is "generally monotonous, and often not empathetic," thus
being infrequent and substandard.73 Radios and televisions are often
prohibited, and books and very few belongings are allowed in a solitary
confinement cell.74 The person's food is passed through a slot in the steel
75
door, and recreation occurs in a barren area without any equipment.
An incarcerated person can spend anywhere from days to decades
in solitary confinement. 76 Albert Woodfox, for example, served fortythree years in solitary confinement in a Louisiana state prison.77 With
respect to duration, the U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights
Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment 78 defines prolonged solitary confinement as any period of
isolation exceeding fifteen days-the point at79 which the psychological
harm from isolation "become[s] irreversible.,
B. Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness
As the United States began to move away from hospitalizing
individuals with mental illness, "the nation's jails and prison have
become defacto mental hospitals." 80 In fact, the correctional facilities in
some cities house more individuals with mental illness "than all of the
[city's] mental hospitals combined." 81 Furthermore, it is estimated that
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 1 (2011), http://solitarywatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/factsheet-psychological-effects-final.pdf.
71. See id; Fellner, supra note 16, at 402.
72. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. See Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or DegradingTreatment orPunishment, supranote 41, 25.
74. See Fellner, supra note 16, at 402.
75. Id.
76. See SAL RODRIGUEZ, SOLITARY WATCH, FACT SHEET: THE HIGH COST OF SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT 1 (2011), http://solitarywatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/fact-sheet-the-highcost-of-solitary-confinement.pdf.
77. See Jacob Koffier, What 43 Years of Solitary Confinement Does to the Mind, TIME (June
9, 2015), http://time.con/3914559/albert-woodfox-solitary-confinement-angola.
78. See Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment,supra note 41, 26.
79. Id.
80.

GILLIGAN & LEE, supra note 14, at 2.

81. Id (noting that both Los Angeles and New York City jails each house more individuals
with mental illness than the mental health institutions within their cities, and that about fifty years
ago, approximately seventy-five percent of individuals with mental illness were in mental health
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"[t]here are three times as many mentally ill people in prisons than in
mental health hospitals, and the rate of mental illness in prisons is two to
four times greater than in the general public. 82
Some states have implemented mental health courts83 to divert
people with mental illness from the criminal justice system. 84 Mental
health courts, however, are only an option for individuals who meet the
eligibility requirements. 85 Individuals with mental illness who are
87
otherwise ineligible for this diversion,8 6 however, remain in the system.
In the federal court system, under 18 U.S.C. § 4244, the court may place
an individual in treatment instead of prison if there is reasonable cause to
believe that such defendant is suffering from a mental disease, and the
court believes that a mental hospital is better equipped to treat the
individual than a correctional facility. 88 If the court identifies mental

illness, but not to a level that would warrant diversion, "the sentencing
judge may recommend the offender's placement in a correction facility
capable of providing for his mental health needs ... [but] these
facilities and twenty-five percent were in prisons). Today, that proportion has shifted significantly
with only five percent of the population in mental health facilities and ninety-five percent in prisons.
Id. at 2-3.
82. Fellner, supra note 16, at 392; see GILLIGAN & LEE, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that in
Rikers Island specifically, in 2013, "roughly 40% of the inmates [had] a psychiatric diagnosis, and a
third of them exhibit[ed] acute or chronic psychopathology severe enough to constitute major
(psychotic, and in some cases life-threatening) mental illnesses"). Compare RODRIGUEZ, supra note
70 (estimating that twenty percent of all incarcerated persons are "seriously mentally ill" (quoting
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS (2d ed. 2000)), with

Serious Mental Illness (SMI) Among U.S. Adults, NIH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/
prevalence/serious-mental-illness-smi-among-us-adults.shtm
(estimating that individuals with
serious mental illness make up 4.2% of all U.S. adults).
83. See, e.g., Mental Health Courts, NYCOURTS.GOv, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/
problem solving/mh/keyprinciples.shtml [hereinafter Mental Health Courts, NYCOuRTS.Gov];
Mental Health Courts, MD. CTS., http://mdcourts.gov/opsc/mhc [hereinafter Mental Health Courts,
MD. CTS.] (providing two examples of mental health courts).
84. See, e.g., Mental Health Courts, NYCOURTS.GOV, supra note 83. New York State's
mental health courts aim to divert individuals with mental health diagnoses out of formal
incarceration and into community-based services. Id. These programs, however, are only targeted to
individuals whose current involvement with the criminal justice system is a by-product of mental
illness. Id.
85. See Henry J. Steadman et al., Effect of Mental Health Courts on Arrests and Jail Days: A
Multisite Study, 68 ARCHIVAL GEN. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167-68 (2011). Although mental health
courts vary by jurisdiction, in general, such courts are a "postbooking jail diversion program" that
aim to "mov[e] persons with mental illness out of the criminal justice system and into community
treatment without sacrificing public safety." Id. In lieu of incarceration, the mental health court
refers eligible participants to community-based treatment and the court monitors their progress and
compliance, reserving the right to sanction or revoke the option to participate. Id. at 168.
86. See, e.g., Mental Health Courts, NYCOURTS.GOv, supra note 83.
87. See id.
88. See E. Lea Johnston, Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing: The Case of Seriously
DisorderedOffenders, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 625, 650 (2014).
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recommendations [do not] bind[] correctional authorities., 89 As a result,
prison populations have a high prevalence of schizophrenia, bi-polar
disorder, anxiety, depression, and personality disorders. 90 In spite of the
high prevalence of mental illness, no concessions are made for
individuals with mental illness while incarcerated, 91 and thus, such
illness. 92
individuals are treated the same as individuals without mental
Because "their illness leaves them less able to conform to the rules,"
individuals with mental illness have a disproportionately high rate of
to fifty percent
prison infractions. 93 One report estimates that thirty-three
94
illness.
mental
have
confinement
solitary
in
of prisoners
New York City jails, in particular, have increased the use of solitary
confinement over time.95 This trend occurred despite the city's crime
decrease and the increased population of individuals with mental illness
at Rikers Island. 96 On July 23, 2013, two months after Browder's
in New York
release, 9v 73% of the adolescents in solitary confinement
ill. 9t
City's jails were seriously or moderately mentally
To further complicate matters, prison staff has difficulty adequately
screening for mental illnesses, leaving individuals with mental illness

89. Id. at 652.
90. HOLLY HILLS ET AL., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EFFECTIVE PRISON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES:
GUIDELINES TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE TREATMENT 2-3 (2004) (noting that approximately five

percent of the prison population has schizophrenia; six percent has bi-polar disorder; nine percent
has major depression; six percent has generalized anxiety disorder; and thirty to fifty percent have
antisocial personality disorder).
91. See Fellner, supranote 16, at 394.
92. See id. at 395 (noting that individuals with mental illness have greater difficulty following
prison rules and, in turn, they "may exhibit their illness through disruptive behavior, belligerence,
aggression, and violence[,] ... ways that prison systems consider punishable misconduct").
93. Id. at 396. For example:
A study in New York found that inmates on the mental health roster "have higher
infraction rates than [other] inmates." In Washington State, "offenders with serious
mental illness constitute 18.7 percent of the prison population but account for 41 percent
of the infractions." According to the Federal Bureau of Justice Statistics, mentally ill
prisoners in state and federal prisons as well as local jails are more likely than others to
have been involved in a fight or to have been charged with breaking prison rules.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Kenneth Adams, The Disciplinary Experiences of Mentally
DisorderedInmates, 13 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 297, 304 (1986); and then quoting David Lovell &
Ron Jemelka, When Inmates Misbehave: The Costs of Discipline,76 PRISON J. 165, 167 (1996)).
94. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 70, at 1.
95. See GILLIGAN & LEE, supranote 14, at 3 ("From 2007 through June 30, 2013, the number
of punitive segregation beds in the City jail system has grown from 614 to 998, a 61.5% increase.
On January 1, 2004, 2.7% of the inmate population was in punitive segregation. By June 30, 2013
the percentage had jumped to 7.5%.").
96. Id.
97. Id; see also Gonnerman, supra note 13 (noting that Browder was released from Rikers
Island in May 2013).
98. See GILLIGAN & LEE, supranote 14, at 3.
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unidentified. 99 Certain barriers-staffing,

an

273

incarcerated person's

functioning limitations, lack of continuity of care, and an inadequate
system of follow up-inhibit individuals with unidentified mental illness

from receiving appropriate treatment while incarcerated. 100 With respect
to staffing, in at least one state, the correctional system lacked 54.1% of
the psychiatrists needed to meet the mental health needs of its
incarcerated persons. 10 1 As a result, the mental health staff were left to
"manag[e] far larger caseloads than is appropriate and effective," leaving
10 2
them to do only "about 50% of what we should be doing."'

Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court noted:
This shortfall of resources relative to demand contributes to significant
delays in treatment. Mentally ill prisoners are housed in administrative
segregation while awaiting transfer to scarce mental health treatment
beds for appropriate care. One correctional officer indicated that he
had kept mentally ill prisoners in segregation for "6 months or more."
Other prisoners awaiting care are held in tiny, phone-booth sized
cages. The record documents
instances of prisoners committing suicide
103
while awaiting treatment.

Because mental health professionals are few and far between in
prison settings, such professionals are often used for treatment and
assessment. 10 4 Screening, therefore, is often left to prison officials who
may not have any mental health expertise.105 Because the prison
population includes individuals with cognitive and developmental
limitations, 10 6 these limitations, coupled with mental illness and poor
communication skills, impede an individual's ability to effectively
99. Fellner, supra note 16, at 396-97 ("Officers typically do not understand the nature of
mental illness and its behavioral impact. They cannot distinguish-and may not even know a
distinction exists-between a frustrated or disgruntled inmate who 'acts out' and one whose 'acting
out' reflects mental illness."); Johnston, supranote 88, at 632-33.
100. See Johnston, supra note 88, at 633-36.
101. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 517-18 (2011). In this case, the Court held that as a result
of the prison overcrowding, "the medical and mental health care provided by California's prisons
[fell] below the standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 545.
102. Id. at 518.
103. Id. at 519.
104. See HILLS ET AL., supranote 90, at 14.
105. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1320 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (affirming a magistrate
judge's ruling that due to inadequate training, the custodial staff is "frequently unable to
differentiate between inmates whose conduct is the result of mental illness and inmates whose
conduct is unaffected by disease"); HILLS ET AL., supra note 90, at 14; Johnston, supra note 88, at
635 ("[M]ental health professionals with extensive training in assessment and diagnoses, such as
psychologists and psychiatrists, rarely conduct mental health screenings. Instead, the screens are
often performed more economically ...by nurses, counselors, or social workers." (footnote
omitted)).
106. See Johnston, supranote 88, at 635.
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1 7
communicate mental illness symptoms during the screening process. 0
The inability to communicate symptoms, coupled with the lack of the
staff's expertise during the screening process, may result in the
misidentification of mental illness: individuals with mental illness may
10 8
be deemed either as not having mental illness or malingering.
Furthermore, the prison staff that conduct the screening frequently must
rely solely on the individual's self-reports, as they do not have access to
the mental health assessments conducted during trial or any other mental
health history. 109 After the first screening is completed and the individual
is triaged accordingly, in some instances a second screening is not
done. 110 Since "mental health screening interviews are often conducted

at the cell front, rather than in a private setting,

. . .

inmates are generally

quite reluctant to disclose psychological distress" resulting from their
solitary confinement."' In addition, "[s]eclusion, even when it is not
punitive, does not allow for optimal observation, for one can only speak
through a glass window or a hole in the door."1 ' 2 Given the foregoing
barriers to appropriate and effective screening, individuals with mental
illness may be placed in the general population without the appropriate
treatment and care. 1 3 Subsequently, when such an individual acts out,
"correctional officers tend to misinterpret symptomatic illness as
14
disorderly conduct."'
107. Id.
108. Id. ("[R]efusal to acknowledge one's disorder[] is a common symptom of some serious
mental illnesses, and inmates may go to great lengths to hide their maladies as a manifestation of
their disorders." (footnotes omitted)).
109. Id. at 635-36 ("Evaluators commonly do not have the results of prior psychiatric
evaluations, even those conducted in connection with a competency examination, insanity
proceeding, or pretrial detention. Inmates usually do not bring medication containers, prescriptions,
or copies of their medical records to a diagnostic center. . . . Without this data, screeners must rely
on inmates' willingness and ability to share information about their mental health. Consequently,
prisoners' mental disorders can go undetected." (footnote omitted)).
110. Id. at 632 ("While inmates who screen positive for mental disorder will undergo
additional assessment, few safety nets exist for prisoners whose mental health problems are not
recognized or cognizable at the initial screening point. Legal commentators have urged prisons to
conduct a subsequent screen to identify inmates whose disorders were not initially detected or who
have developed mental health problems during the course of their confinement." (footnotes
omitted)).
111. See Grassian, supra note 43, at 333.
112. GILLIGAN & LEE, supra note 14, at 12-13. Thus, solitary confinement also affects the
quality of treatment provided since the seclusion inhibits the required observation, assessment, and
treatment. See id.
113. See Johnston, supranote 88, at 632.
114. Id. at 633 ("'[Clustody staff essentially make medical judgments that should be reserved
for clinicians .. ' (quoting Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1995))); see
also RODRIGUEZ, supra note 70, at 1 (asserting that because behavioral problems sometimes result
from mental illness symptoms, solitary confinement is used to isolate those with mental illness);
Fellner, supra note 16, at 397 (describing the way in which "[p]risoners who tear up bed-sheets to
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Solitary confinement is known to both exacerbate symptoms in
individuals with mental illness and create symptoms in individuals
without. 1 5 Individuals with mental illness who have been subjected to
solitary confinement have been observed to decompensate 1 6 while in
segregation.' 7 Such decompensation increases the likelihood of selfharm and "lengthens the time needed for a mentally ill prisoner's
cognitive and psychological functioning to be restored and in some
instances there will be no restoration." '" 8 When individuals with mental
illness decompensate significantly while in solitary confinement, they
are temporarily removed, treated, and returned to solitary confinement
"where the cycle continues." 1 9 Notably, individuals who spent time in
solitary confinement commit a disproportionate amount of prison
suicides. 120 Specific psychiatric symptoms, which one expert identified
make a rope for hanging themselves have been punished for misusing state property," thus being
treated punitively and not therapeutically).
115. See GILLIGAN & LEE, supra note 14, at 4-5 ("Individuals with a pre-existing mental
illness are particularly vulnerable to the pathogenic effects of solitary confinement, especially if
they are already in the pathogenic setting of a jail."); Erica Goode, Solitary Confinement:
Punishedfor Life, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/health/solitaryconfinement-mental-illness.html?_r=l. The following has been stated regarding the effect of
solitary confinement on the mentally ill:
Prolonged solitary confinement (sensory deprivation and social isolation) can induce
psychotic symptoms (such as hallucinations and delusions) and behavioral abnormalities
(including suicidality and homicidality) in people who had not previously experienced
such symptoms. While those with pre-existing symptoms may be more vulnerable to
their exacerbation, those without pre-existing symptoms may also be vulnerable to
experiencing such symptoms for the first time. Thus, the use of punitive segregation
even among those not diagnosed as mentally ill is likely to increase the frequency of
mental illness in the jail population, together with associated symptoms such as suicidal
and assaultive behavior.
GILLIGAN & LEE, supranote 14, at 8. A report from 2011 further provided:
Research has shown that with respect to mental disabilities, solitary confinement often
results in severe exacerbation of a previously existing mental condition. Prisoners with
mental health issues deteriorate dramatically in isolation. The adverse effects of solitary
confinement are especially significant for persons with serious mental health problems
which are usually characterized by psychotic symptoms and/or significant functional
impairment. Some engage in extreme acts of self-mutilation and even suicide.
Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
DegradingTreatment or Punishment,supra note 41, 68 (footnotes omitted).
116. See id. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm'n v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., No. l:08-cv-01317TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 6738517, at *16 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Fellner, supranote 16, at 404.
120. See Goode, supra note 115 ("[S]uicides among prisoners in solitary confinement, who
make up 3 to 8 percent of the nation's prison population, account for about 50 percent of prison
suicides."); see also Ind Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm 'n, 2012 WL 6738517, at *16 ("Tragically,
a disproportionately high percentage of suicides are committed by prisoners in segregation
compared with those in the general population of a prison system."); GILLIGAN & LEE, supra note
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are common among individuals in solitary confinement, include (1)
hypersensitivity to external stimuli; (2) perceptual distortions, illusions,
and hallucinations; (3) panic attacks; (4) difficulties with thinking,
concentration, and memory; (5) overt paranoia; and (6) problems
with impulse control.121 Unfortunately, these psychological effects did
not end when the isolation ended. 122 Symptoms found to persist
following solitary confinement
were post-traumatic stress and lasting
1 23
changes.
personality
III.

CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE: Do OUR LAWS ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS THE PROBLEM?

There are international and domestic laws that address the need to
protect individuals who are incarcerated. 124 Further, international laws
and U.S. courts have begun to address the need to protect individuals
placed in solitary confinement. 25 International laws significantly limit
the use of solitary confinement and establish safeguards that an
incarcerated individual may employ prior to spending time in solitary
confinement. 126 U.S. law, on the other hand, does not explicitly address
solitary confinement. 27 Judicial decisions, however, address solitary
confinement in circumstances where general prison conditions are
challenged.128 These decisions have also begun to address the use of
solitary confinement and people with mental illness. 29 The U.S. legal
system provides much less protection than international law, and the gap
in protection leaves individuals with mental
illness particularly
30
harm.
long-term
and
significant
to
susceptible

14, at 11 ("Those who are already 'mentally ill and have a history of suicidal gestures/attempts (or
who are at risk for suicidal behavior or acute decompensation)' will be especially vulnerable to the
harmful effects of solitary confinement.").
121. Grassian, supra note 43, at 335-36.
122. Id. at 353-54.
123. Id.("[T]hese individuals had become strikingly socially impoverished and experienced
intense irritation with social interaction, patterns dramatically different from their functioning prior
to solitary confinement.").
124.
125.

See infra Part HIA-C.
See infra Part HI.A-D.

126. See Fellner, supra note 16, at 409 ("International instruments... require.., that the law
or lawful regulations specify what conduct constitutes an offense and give the prisoner a right to be
heard before disciplinary action is taken.").
127.
128.

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.

129. See infra Part hI.C.
130. Compare infra Part III.A, with infra Part III.B
(describing the way in which international
standards note the maximum length an individual can be in solitary confinement but domestic laws
do not).
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A. InternationalTreaties and Conventions
Various treaties address and set a standard for prisoner rights. 31 In
1945, article 55 of the United Nations Charter ("U.N. Charter")
established "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." 132 In 1948, article 5 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights ("Universal Declaration") established that "[n]o one
shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
33
punishment.'
or
Although the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration did not
explicitly enumerate the rights and standard of treatment for incarcerated
individuals, in 1949, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War did. 134 Applying only to prisoners of war, 135 this
convention "delineated that prisoners ...were to be treated humanely at
all times, [and] also provided [the] basic definitions and principles for
future international prisoner standards."' 13 6 In 1955, the United Nations
issued the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
("Standard Rules"), 137 which applied to prisons globally. 138 Pursuant to
the Standard Rules, solitary
confinement was to be used "only in
139
exceptional circumstances."'
In 1992, the United States ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 140 and two years later, in 1994, ratified the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment ("Convention Against Torture").' 4 1 The United
States ratified these treaties with reservations, only barring treatment
deemed unconstitutional. 142 The U.N. Committee on Torture, formed to
131. Vasiliades, supra note 41, at 79-80.
132. Id. at 80.
133. Id.at 80-81.
134. Id. at 83.
135. Id. at 81-82.
136. Id.at 81.
137. Id. at 83.
138. See id; see also Fellner, supra note 16, at 409 (noting that the Standard Rules not only
require adequate mental health care for prisoners but also acknowledge that individuals with serious
mental illness should not be in prison and should instead be in institutions for treatment).
139. See Vasiliades, supra note 41, at 83.
140. See id. at 84. Specifically addressing the treatment of prisoners, article 10 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that prisoners must be "treated with
humanity and with respect" and that the "'essential aim... [of prisons] shall be [the prisoner's]
reformation and social rehabilitation."' Fellner, supranote 16, at 407.
141. See Status of Ratification InteractiveDashboard,UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH
COMMISSIONER, http://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
142. See id.("[T]he United States considers itself bound by the obligation under article 16 to
prevent 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,' only insofar as the term 'cruel,
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oversee the way in which participating countries implement the
Convention Against Torture, 143 held that prolonged solitary confinement
is torture and, in turn, a human rights violation.' 44 Due to the
reservations of the United States, however, the protections that the
treaties aimed to provide-protection against cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment, and treatment that causes severe mental pain
or
145
suffering-apply only to treatment that the Constitution prohibits.
Internationally, there is no consensus as to the appropriate length of
time to sentence someone to solitary confinement. 146 But, the European
Court of Human Rights held that confining someone to solitary
confinement for three years violated article 3 of the European
Convention of Human Rights. 147 Moreover, considering the health
effects, the U.N. General Assembly provided:
[T]he use of solitary confinement itself can amount to acts prohibited
by article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
torture as defined in article 1 of the Convention against Torture or
[other acts of] cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment as defined in
article 16 of the Convention.141
Nevertheless, individuals in the United States have failed in their
attempts to challenge being detained in solitary confinement for up to
forty years-thirty-seven years longer than what is acceptable under the
European Convention of Human Rights.' 49 The United States is a
signatory on various international treaties in which it agrees to ensure
humane treatment to people within its care. 150 Despite these agreements
and the known mental health outcomes, solitary confinement continues
to be employed in a manner that is below international standards.''
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment
or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States.").
143.

See Committee Against Torture, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER,

http://www.ohchr.orgIen/hrbodies/cat/pages/catindex.aspx.
144. See GILLIGAN & LEE, supra note 14, at 6.
145. See Vasiliades, supra note 41, at 85-86.
146. Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment orPunishment,supra note 41, 61.
147. Id.
148. Id. 70.
149. Seeid 61.
150. See Status of Ratification InteractiveDashboard,supra note 141 (noting the way in which
the United States has signed and ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Convention Against Torture).
1 51. Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 41, 74 ("Where the physical conditions of
solitary confinement are so poor and the regime so strict that they lead to severe mental and physical
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B. Domestic Laws: Are Individuals with Mental Illnesses Protected?
Individuals who are incarcerated are not stripped of their
constitutional rights simply because they are imprisoned.152 Although
there are statutes that give individuals who are incarcerated an avenue to
assert their rights, there are others that inhibit this exercise. 153 While
some legislation affirms prisoners' rights, subsequent legislation often
limits such rights or erects barriers that inhibit incarcerated persons from
15 4
asserting their rights or seeking redress when such rights are violated.
1. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act and Prison
Litigation Reform Act: One Gives Rights, While the Other
Takes Them Away
In response to various complaints of constitutional violations in
prisons, 155 Congress enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act ("CRIPA")156 to provide a means for incarcerated individuals to
seek redress. 157 Pursuant to CRIPA, the DOJ is authorized to investigate
conduct that violates the constitutional rights of institutionalized
individuals.' 58 Accordingly, the DOJ has the authority to protect the
constitutional rights of individuals confined in jails, prisons, and other
public correctional facilities.15 9 Close to two decades later, Congress
pain or suffering of individuals who are subjected to the confinement, the conditions of solitary
confinement amount to torture or to cruel and inhuman treatment as defined in articles 1 and 16 of
the Convention, and constitute a breach of article 7 of the Covenant.").
152. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
153. See infra Part III.B.1-2 (discussing the way in which the law limits a person's ability to
bring a claim to challenge a violation). Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 12132 (2012), with id.
§§ 1997a(a), 1997e. Section 1983 provides a cause of action allowing individuals to bring a suit
against the government in response to a constitutional violation. Id. § 1983. Similarly, the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") of 1990 explicitly prohibits discrimination against people
with disabilities in various settings, including incarceration. Id § 12131. Pursuant to the ADA,
mental illness is a disability and unjustified and intentional isolation of a person with mental illness
constitutes discrimination. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999).
154. See infra Part fII.B.1-2.
155. Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Enigmatic Exhaustion
Requirement: What It Means and What Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials Can Learn
from It, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 483,493 (2001).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1997.
157. Branham, supranote 155, at493-94.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a) ("Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
that any State ... or agent thereof... is subjecting persons residing in or confined to an
institution.., to egregious or flagrant conditions which deprive such persons of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States... the Attorney General... may institute a civil action... against such party for such
equitable relief as may be appropriate to insure the minimum corrective measures necessary to
insure the full enjoyment of such rights, privileges, or immunities ....
159. Id. §§ 1997a(a), 1997(1).
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enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). 160 The PLRA has
two main aims-end the courts' increased management of correctional
facilities and reduce the number of unsubstantiated claims by
prisoners. 161 As such, PLRA provides that "[n]o federal civil action may
be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional
facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without
a prior showing of physical injury. 1 62 Additionally, PLRA "requires that
prisoners exhaust all internal administrative remedies before bringing a
lawsuit, imposes filing fees, limits damages and attorney's fees, and
requires judicially enforceable consent decrees to contain findings of
' 163
federal law violations."
Although these statutes provide an avenue to seek redress, the
avenue is not as apparent for individuals with mental illness in solitary
confinement. 164 The effects of solitary confinement are commonly
psychological. 165 The burden to prove an accompanying physical injury
bars individuals only psychologically injured as a result of solitary
confinement from seeking redress.1 66 Additionally, one researcher
argued that an individual's mental illness may make it more difficult to
comply with the formal grievance process, including adhering to the
prescribed deadlines. 167 Both CRIPA and PLRA provide the means for
individuals in solitary confinement to sue for violations. 168 However, the
symptoms associated with mental illness make these means unrealistic,
leaving such individuals 169
without a viable remedy for the harms inflicted
confinement.
solitary
by
Recently, the DOJ began investigating claims made by individuals
with mental illness in connection with solitary confinement.17 ° These
160. Branham, supra note 155, at 487.
161. Id. at 487-89.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). In addition to having to prove a physical injury, the PLRA also
provides an administrative exhaustion requirement, thus creating an additional barrier for
incarcerated persons to overcome to redress their injuries. Id. § 1997e(a) ("No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions.., by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.").
163. Fellner, supra note 16, at 406.
164. See, e.g., supra note 162 and accompanying text (providing that a physical injury is
required to bring a suit under this statute).
165. See supranotes 48, 121 and accompanying text.
166. See supranote 162 and accompanying text.
167. Feltner, supra note 16, at 406.
168. See supraPart III.B.1.
169. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 167.
170. See Settlement Agreement at 1, United States v. Territory of the V.I., 280 F.R.D. 232
(D.V.I. Aug. 31, 2012) (No. 1986-265), ECF No. 689-1 (documenting that the DOJ brought an
action against the Virgin Islands to "remedy the ongoing constitutional violations" in its prisons);
JOCELYN SAMUELS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT
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investigations found that at least one state's correctional facilities used
solitary confinement in a manner that violated the Eighth Amendment
and the American with Disabilities Act. 17 1 However, the subsequent
reports that were produced only included recommendations for
to provide any details on how it
improvements. 172 The DOJ also failed
73
plans to ensure future compliance.
2. Federal Torts Claims Act: Additional Barriers and Limitations
Pursuant to the Federal Torts Claims Act ("FTCA"), federal
prisoners may bring an action against the government for money
damages upon any "injury ...caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment." 174 Other provisions within this
statute, however, prohibit individuals with mental illness who have
experienced aggravated psychological harm in solitary confinement to
seek redress through this statute.' 75 Specifically, two barriers hinder this
population: (1) required proof of physical injury 176 and (2) required
administrative exhaustion. 177 For example, the FTCA bars individuals
convicted of a felony who are awaiting sentencing or serving a sentence
from bringing a cause of action under this statute for "mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury.', 178 Similarly, an individual is barred from bringing a
[has] first
cause of action under the FTCA "unless the claimant
79
presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency.'

OF CORRECTIONS' USE OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON PRISONERS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL
ILLNESS AND/OR INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 4 (2014) (documenting that DOJ investigated

constitutional violations at the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections); U.S. ATT'Y FOR THE S.
DIST. OF N.Y., supra note 14, at 1 (documenting that the DOJ investigated the way in which
adolescent males were treated at Rikers Island).
171.
172.

See SAMUELS, supranote 170, at 3-4.
See id.at 22-25; U.S. ATT'Y FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., supranote 14, at 51-63.

173. See SAMUELS, supranote 170, at 22-25; U.S. ATT'Y FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., supra note
14, at 51-63.
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012).
175. See, e.g., id. §§ 1346(b)(2), § 2675(a).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2) ("No person convicted of a felony who is incarcerated while
awaiting sentencing or while serving a sentence may bring a civil action against the United
States... for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury.").
177. Id. § 2675(a) (establishing that, in order to bring a claim against the government, "the
claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency").
178. Id. § 1346(b)(2).
179. Id. § 2675(a).
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C. JudicialInvolvement: BalancingAdministrative and
Mental Health Needs
The Supreme Court has held that "[p]rison walls do not form' 18a0
barrier separating inmates from the protections of the Constitution,"
and that prison staff have a duty to protect the individuals within their
care. 81 The Court, on the other hand, also acknowledged:
Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires
expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches
of government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been
committed to the responsibility of those branches .... Where a state
penal system is involved, federal courts have ... additional
reason to
82
accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities. 1
As a result, the Court gives "prison administrators... Wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in
their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and
to maintain institutional security."' 183 Because solitary confinement is an
administrative punishment, prison administrators have the sole discretion
to impose this sanction. 184 As such, they may do so absent the procedural
safeguards normally present-such as access to jury trials before a
presiding judge with legal representation t -thus, hindering the ability
to challenge placement in solitary confinement. 86 Concerned that
"accommodating mental illness will provide excuses for prisoner
misconduct," during administrative hearings within the correctional88
facility, 187 the prisoner's mental illness is not taken into consideration. 1
Moreover, because the burden of proof at these hearings is only a
preponderance of evidence,1 89 incarcerated individuals accused of

180. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
181. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984); see also Hayes v. N.Y.C. Dep't of
Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996) (interpreting this duty pursuant to the Eighth Amendment).
182. Turner,482 U.S. at 84-85.
183. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 ("Subjecting
the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously
hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solution to the
intractable problems of prison administration.").
184. See Zoghlin, supranote 58, at 25.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Fellner, supra note 16, at 398.
188. See id. ("[P]unishment supersedes any potential recognition that a mentally ill prisoner
may not have been meaningfully able to control his behavior.").
189. Zoghlin, supra note 58, at 25.
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infractions are often found guilty. 190 This unbridled discretion allows
prison staff to "determin[e] when and for how long solitary confinement
may be imposed on an inmate."' 9 1 As such, incarcerated persons often
have a difficult time challenging2 or seeking recourse regarding their
9
solitary confinement placement. 1
Cases addressing solitary confinement have come before the court
since the late 1890s. 193 Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted."' 94 At least one court held that the Eighth
Amendment requires jail officials to "'provide humane conditions of
confinement' for prisoners."' 195 To prevail in an Eighth Amendment
challenge, the "prisoner[] must show both an objective and serious
injury (either physical or psychological) and a culpable subjective intent
196
on the part of the prison authorities.',
To date, the Supreme Court has yet to rule whether solitary
confinement specifically violates the Eighth Amendment. 197 In 1995,
however, a district court held that the California Department of
Correction's use of solitary confinement violated the plaintiffs' Eighth
Amendment rights. 198 Considering the Department's "deliberate
indifference to the serious harm visited on the class members," the court
deemed its use of solitary confinement unconstitutional "[(1)] because
mentally ill inmates are placed in administrative segregation and
segregated housing without any evaluation of their mental status, [(2)]
because such placement will cause further decompensation, and [(3)]
because inmates are denied access to necessary mental health care while
they are housed."'

99

Similarly, in 2012, a district court held that the

Indiana Department of Correction's use of solitary confinement on
incarcerated persons who were mentally ill violated such persons Eighth

190. Id.
191. Hresko, supra note 20, at 13.
192. See id. at 15.
193. See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 173 (1890) (holding that the additional sentence to
solitary confinement ex post facto was unconstitutional). In its ruling, the Court noted that solitary
confinement was "itself an infamous punishment." Id.at 169.
194. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
195. See Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm'n v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317TWO-MJD, 2012 WL 6738517, at *20 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 832 (1994)).
196. Fellner, supra note 16, at 405.
197. Cedric Richmond, Toward a More ConstitutionalApproach to Solitary Confinement: The
Casefor Reform, 52 HARV.J. ON LEGIs. 1, 10 (2015).

198. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
199. Id.at 1320-21.
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Amendment rights. 200 But, because the Eighth Amendment applies only
to individuals convicted of crimes, pretrial detainees like Browder are
unable to seek redress under the Eighth Amendment.2 1
Individuals who are incarcerated can also challenge the
constitutionality of solitary confinement under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.20 2 In addition to granting prison
administrators wide discretion to use solitary confinement, the Court
also held that implementing such punishment with a lax, non-adversarial
process does not violate an incarcerated person's Fourteenth
Amendment rights.20 3 More specifically, in Hewitt v. Helms, 4 the
petitioner was placed in solitary confinement following a prison riot.205
The petitioner argued that the Due Process Clause20 6 affords him the
"right to remain in the general population."20 The Court disagreed.20 8
The Court also examined whether the petitioner's Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process rights were violated when he was placed in
solitary confinement absent a formal trial and adjudication. 20 9 Noting
that only an "informal, nonadversary review" of evidence is required, the
Court held that such action was not unconstitutional. 210 The Court
200. Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm 'n, 2012 WL 6738517, at *25. More specifically, the
court stated:
Applying the standard just described, the Court finds that mentally ill prisoners within
the [Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC")] segregation units are not receiving
minimally adequate mental health care in terms of scope, intensity, and duration and the
IDOC has been deliberately indifferent. Based on the facts and law set forth in this
Entry, therefore, it is the Court's conclusion that the treatment of the mentally ill
prisoners housed in IDOC segregation units and the New Castle Psychiatric Unit, and the
failure to provide adequate treatment for such prisoners, violates the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at *23.
201. See Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 474 (7th Cir. 2009) ("The Supreme Court has not
directly addressed whether the Eighth Amendment is applicable to pre sentencing detainees, but it
has indicated that the answer is no. According to the Court, 'the State does not acquire the power to
punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.' The Court later confirmed that such a
'formal adjudication' includes both conviction and sentence." (first quoting Ingraham ex reL
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977); and then quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 392 n.6 (1989))); Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685-86 (6th Cir. 2001).
202. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 475-76 (1995); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
462 (1983).
203. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 474.
204. Id. at 462-64.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 466-67.
207. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480.
208. See id.
209. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472.
210. See id. at 472, 476 ("An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges against
him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to
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nevertheless provided that language in the state procedural guidelines
created a liberty interest, which, if violated, can be used as a means to
seek redress by those who are incarcerated.21' Years later, the Court
found this ruling problematic. 12 In Sandin v. Conner,2 13 the petitioner
argued that his transfer from the general population to solitary
confinement violated his rights under the Due Process Clause.2 14 The
Court affirmed that there are instances where liberty interests are created
while someone is incarcerated that are protected by the Due Process
Clause.215 But, the Court held that such transfer did not violate the Due
Process Clause because "segregated confinement did not present the
type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might
conceivably create a liberty interest," nor did the state's action extend
the petitioner's sentence without formal adjudication.t 6
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of solitary
confinement and pretrial detainees. In Bell v. Wolfish,2 17 the Court held
that "under the Due Process clause, a detainee may not be punished prior
218
to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.,
However, if the "[g]ovemment ... has legitimate interests that stem
from its need to manage the facility," the prison may enforce
administrative measures to ensure prison safety even when such
measures may exceed the very purpose of pretrial confinement, which is
to ensure that the pretrial detainee appears in court. 21 9 As a result, the
Due Process Clause affords pretrial detainees additional procedural
rights that are not required for convicted individuals. 220 This protection,
transfer him to administrative segregation. Ordinarily a written statement by the inmate will
accomplish this purpose .... So long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and
then-available evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied.").
211. SeeSandin,515U.S.at480.
212. See id. at 481 ("By shifting the focus of the liberty interest inquiry to one based on the
language of a particular regulation, and not the nature of the deprivation, the Court encouraged
prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory language on which to base entitlement to
various state-conferred privileges."). Additionally, the Court noted:
Hewitt has produced at least two undesirable effects. First, it creates disincentives
for States to codify prison management procedures in the interest of uniform
treatment .... Second, the Hewitt approach has led to the involvement of federal courts
in the day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little
offsetting benefit to anyone.
Id. at 482.
213. Id. 475-76.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 483-84.
216. Id.at486.
217. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
218. Id. at 535-36.
219. See id. at 540.
220. Compare supra text accompanying note 196, with supranote 210 and accompanying text.
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however, is subject to a limitation. 22' Regarding solitary confinement
specifically, at least one court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause is violated upon placing a pretrial detainee in
isolation absent a legitimate institutional objective and evaluation of the
incarcerated person's medical needs.222
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments each provide a distinct
means to seek redress.2 23 The Eighth Amendment protects individuals
who have already been sentenced, leaving individuals like Browder to
look elsewhere for protection.224 The petitioner must further show that
the prison staff had deliberate indifference when the harm was
inflicted.225 The Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, applies
to pretrial detainees and sentenced individuals alike.226 The lax,
non-adversarial process and safety exception, however, limit the
availability, leaving this population no real
Fourteenth Amendment's
227
tool to seek redress.

D. Settlement Agreements: A Step in the Right Direction,
Are They Enough?
More often than not, actions brought against correctional facilities
for mistreatment or constitutional violations are settled.228 For example,
in Ingles v. Toro,229 a class of incarcerated persons sued various
corrections officials alleging that the officials' excessive use of force
violated the class members' constitutional rights. 230 The parties settled
and the court noted its concern that "[t]he agreement is a private
(noting that an informal hearing is required prior to placing a pretrial detainee in solitary
confinement, whereas such hearing is not required for convicted individuals similarly placed).
221. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 ("The fact of confinement as well as the legitimate goals and
policies of the penal institution limits these retained constitutional rights ...A detainee simply does
not possess the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual.").
222. See Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 450-51 (8th Cir. 2010).
223. See supranotes 193-222 and accompanying text.
224. See supranote 201 and accompanying text.
225. See supratext accompanying note 199.
226. See supranotes 202-22 and accompanying text.
227. See supranotes 202-10 and accompanying text.
228. For class-action settlements in which plaintiffs sued correctional facilities for
mistreatment, see, for example, Ingles v. Toro, 438 F. Supp. 2d 203, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Settlement Agreement, Ashker v. Governor of California, No. C 09-05796 CW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13,
2015), ECF No. 486-3; Stipulation, Parsons v. Ryan, 289 F.R.D. 513 (D. Ariz. Oct. 14, 2014) (No.
CV 12-00601-PHX-DJH), ECF No. 1185; Stipulation for a Stay with Conditions, Peoples v.
Fischer, No. 11-CV-2694 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2014), ECF No. 123; and Jessica Corso, Pa.
Settles Lawsuit over Treatment of Mentally Ill Inmates, LAW360 (Jan. 6, 2015, 5:50 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/608580/pa-settles-lawsuit-over-treatment-of-mentally-ill-inmates.
229. 438 F. Supp. 2d at 206-07.
230. See id.
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settlement and.., not an enforceable court order or consent decree. 23'
Following this settlement, however, subsequent reviews "revealed
continued instances of serious injury to class members. 2 32 Similarly, in
2 33 following
Ashker v. Governor of California,
a class action brought by
incarcerated persons who were in solitary confinement for ten years or
more and challenged the prison's indefinite use of solitary confinement,
California agreed to reduce the number of individuals in solitary
2 34
confinement and limit the way in which solitary confinement is used.
This agreement gave a magistrate judge the authority to oversee
compliance.235 In Parsons v. Ryan,236 the petitioners alleged that the
prison's excessive use of solitary confinement resulted in harm and
deaths. The Arizona Department of Corrections agreed to modify its use
of solitary confinement for individuals with mental illness, allowing
such population more time outside of the cell and access to mental health
treatment. 7 In Disability Rights Network v. Wetzel, 238 where the
petitioners argued that the state's correctional facilities used solitary
confinement with individuals who are mentally ill in a manner that was
unconstitutional, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections agreed to
stop placing mentally ill incarcerated persons in solitary confinement
and to screen all incarcerated persons for mental illness.239 In the
231. ld.at209,214-16.
I am troubled by one aspect of the proposed settlement-the requirement that any claim
of a breach of the Agreement may be addressed only by bringing a new lawsuit for
breach of contract in state court or by reinstating this action .... [P]laintiffs will be
reluctant to enter into a 'private settlement agreement' because the PLRA limits the
means by which they may enforce such an agreement to seeking relief in state court
under state law. Plaintiffs may return to federal court only to seek reinstatement of the
action-in essence, to rescind the agreement and to proceed to trial .... This decision
was certainly reasonable an understandable, in view of the risks and burdens
of proceeding to trial and the significant and wide-ranging relief obtained as a
result ....But it makes little sense that, if a perceived problem with compliance should
arise, short of seeking reinstatement of this action, plaintiffs can seek relief only in state
court under state law.
Id. at 214-16.
232. Ingles v. Toro, 01 Civ. 8279 (DC) (S.D.N.Y.), LEGAL AID SOC'Y, http://www.legalaid.org/en/lawreform/lawreform/prisonersrightsprojectactivecases/violenceandpersonalsafety/ingles
vtoro.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
233. Settlement Agreement, supranote 228.
234. See Margo Schlanger & Amy Fettig, Eight Principles for Reforming Solitary
Confinement, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 2015, at 34; see also Settlement Agreement, supranote 228.
235. See Settlement Agreement, supranote 228.
236. Stipulation, supranote 228.
237. Parsons v. Ryan, AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/cases/parsons-v-ryan?redirect=
prisoners-rights/parsons-v-ryan (last updated Apr. 11, 2016); see Stipulation, supranote 228, at 7-9.
238. Complaint at 1-3, Disability Rights Network of Pa. v. Wetzel, No. 1:13-CV-00635 (Mar.
11, 2013), ECF No. 1.
239. Id.; Corso, supranote 228.
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Peoples v. Fischer interim settlement, 240 New York became the first
state to ban the use of solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure for
juveniles and pregnant women and also set forth a plan to eliminate its
use as a disciplinary measure on a grander scale.241
In 2013, the Virgin Islands agreed to discontinue using solitary
confinement on individuals with serious mental illness in the Golden
Grove Adult Correctional and Detention Facility. 242 The settlement
agreement provided for the appointment of a neutral monitor to ensure
2 44
comply.
compliance. 243 The Virgin Islands, however, has failed to

According to a February 2015 compliance report, "one individual with
chronic and persistent serious mental illness who has been housed in
segregation for at least 10 years" was still in segregation despite the
agreement. 24 In addition to failing to comply with this term of the
agreement, the correctional facility was deemed non-compliant with the
following: housing incarcerated persons with mental illness based on
their classification, establishing a policy for medical and mental health
rounds to ensure adequate access to care and monitoring, and using
246
A subsequent
segregation in lieu of mental health treatment.
in
non-compliance
highlighted
yet
again
2015
in
June
report
compliance
47
the same areas. Settlement agreements, at best, are working to identify
solutions.2 4t These solutions, however, lack uniform protection for all
individuals who are mentally ill, as the agreements only bind those

240. Stipulation for a Stay with Conditions, supranote 228, at 3-4.
241. Schlanger & Fettig, supra note 234; see also Stipulation for a Stay with Conditions at 3-4,
supra note 228.
242. Settlement Agreement, supranote 170, at 1; Schlanger & Fettig, supra note 234.
243. Settlement Agreement, supranote 170, at 15.
244. KENNETH A. RAY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SIXTH COMPLIANCE MONITORING REPORT 67
(2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/20 15/05/29/goldengrove-mtrrpt6-2-1415.pdf (noting that the facility was noncompliant in (1) developing a procedure for those in isolation
to prevent decompensation, (2) having a mental health provider review disciplinary sanctions to
determine whether the behavior was a symptom of mental illness, and (3) diverting individuals with
mental illness from segregation and providing out-of-cell activities for those who are there).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. KENNETH A. RAY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEVENTH COMPLIANCE MONITORING REPORT
4-5 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2015/06/03/goldengrove mtrrpt7_62-15.pdf ("[Ninety-two percent] of Agreement provisions remain in noncompliance.... Mentally ill
inmates languish in isolation conditions and problems with inmates accessing medical and mental
health services continue. Many inmates are held in administrative and disciplinary segregation for
extraordinary periods of time-some indefinitely-and without an adequate review process prior to
or during such detention.").
248. Compare Part II.B-C, with supra notes 228-46 and accompanying text (demonstrating
the way in which settlement agreements result in prisons agreeing to change their solitary
confinement policies and procedures).
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specific correctional facilities.249 Moreover, even though the facilities
are bound, the agreements are ignored, or worse, the petitioners face
retaliation from the prison administrators.
Settlement agreements, international laws, domestic laws, and
judicial decisions, whether directly or indirectly, require that an
individual's rights be protected even while imprisoned. 1 International
law requires humane care while imprisoned and limits solitary
confinement's use and duration. 2 Federal statutes give incarcerated
individuals a cause of action, if confinement conditions violate their
rights,253 and give the DOJ supervisory authority of prison conditions.254
Additionally, case law extends the protections afforded by the
Americans with Disability Act to safeguard against discriminatory
treatment in prison for individuals with disabilities.25 5 It also affirms that
prison officials are mandated to protect the incarcerated persons in their
care. 256 These avenues have limitations that inhibit redress, and yield lack
of uniform protection.2 57 As a result, individuals with mental illness
continue to be both placed in solitary confinement and negatively
impacted by its egregious effects.258
IV.

PRISONS, INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS, AND SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS

The criminal justice system focuses primarily on adjudicating guilt
and innocence and, as a result, prison conditions are often ignored. 259 As
249. See, e.g., supra notes 233, 237, 239, 241 and accompanying text (providing different
settlement outcomes pursuant to the different agreements).
250. See, e.g., supranotes 244-45 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., text accompanying note 180.
252. See supraPart II.A.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
254. Id.§ 1997a(a).
255. Id. § 12132.
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)-(2) (2012) (giving the district courts jurisdiction to hear suits
brought against the government alleging injury but prohibiting incarcerated persons from bring suits
while incarcerated); 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (providing that an action may be brought against the
United States for injury provided the claimant first goes through the appropriate administrative
channels).
257. See supra Part lII.B.1-2.
258. See supra Part ll.B.
259. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209-10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Too
often, discussion in the legal academy and among practitioners and policymakers concentrates
simply on the adjudication of guilt or innocence. Too easily ignored is the question of what comes
next. Prisoners are shut away-out of sight, out of mind. It seems fair to suggest that, in decades
past, the public may have assumed lawyers and judges were engaged in a careful assessment of
correctional policies, while most lawyers and judges assumed these matters were for the
policyrnakers and correctional experts.").
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discussed above, many laws attempt to address the way in which
individuals with mental illness are treated with respect to solitary
confinement.2 60 Internationally, the laws "acknowledg[e] that the rule of
law and fundamental norms of justice do not stop at the prison gate. 26 1
In the United States, however, the laws, at best, acknowledge a right
afforded to this population but fail to provide an adequate remedy.262
Courts have begun to slowly chip away at solitary confinement.263
But, the current landscape yields only limited oversight to ensure
compliance and a lack of national uniformity when prisons place
individuals with mental illness in solitary confinement.264 As long as
prison administrators are allowed to use solitary confinement, laws must
be enacted to minimize its deleterious effects.265 President Obama,
moved by Browder's story,266 instructed the DOJ to conduct a study and
devise recommendations for solitary confinement.2 67 In January 2016,
President Obama announced plans to adopt the DOJ's recommendations
to reform federal solitary confinement through a series of executive
actions.268 Although these executive actions are a much-needed step in
the right direction, federal legislation is a better route because these
executive actions can be repealed or significantly limited at a later date
by Congress or subsequent presidents.269
260. See supraPart III.A-C.
261. Fellner, supra note 16, at 409.
262. See supra Part I1B.
263. See supraPart HI.D.
264. See, e.g., Ingles v. Toro, 438 F. Supp. 2d 203, 209-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (conferring
supervisory authority to the Department of Corrections); Settlement Agreement, supra note 228, at
19-20 (conferring supervisory authority to a Magistrate Judge who will hear cases brought by
plaintiffs for breach of contract); Stipulation for a Stay with Conditions, supra note 228, at 7-8
(conferring supervisory authority between parties in which defendant is required to provide periodic
reports of compliance to plaintiff's counsel).
265. See infra Part IV.A-C.
266. Obama, supra note 31.
267. Id.
268. Marina Koren, Obama 's Executive Actions on Solitary Confinement, ATLANTIC (Jan. 26,
2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/obama-solitary-confinement/427056;
Obama, supranote 31.
269. John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of
Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REv. 333, 393 (2010). The following illustrates the
different congressional reactions to executive action:
Congress has its own remedies and may react in several ways. First, it may introduce a
new version of, or an amendment to, that prior legislation upon which the order espouses
justification to give better detail as to the expectations of Congress over the presidential
action. Should the President subsequently veto the amended statute, Congress may
override the veto by a vote of two-thirds of its membership in each chamber. Congress
may alternatively rewrite the law to which the order subscribes so that the order comes in
direct conflict with the amended statute. Congress may refuse to fund the agency
charged with carrying out the order ....Finally, Congress may challenge the order in
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Therefore, Congress should enact comprehensive federal legislation
through its taxing or spending powers-a model for states-that controls
and limits a prison's use of solitary confinement on individuals with
mental illness. 270 Such legislation will better protect this population
uniformly while bringing the United States more in line with
international standards. 271 The Solitary Confinement Study and Reform
Act of 2014 ("Solitary Confinement Act"), section 137 of the N.Y.
Correction Law ("SHU Exclusion Law"), and the Peoples v. Fisher
settlement agreement all provide necessary elements to ensure
individuals with mental illness are protected in the event that they are
sentenced to solitary confinement.272 Of the three, New York's SHU
Exclusion Law is the only legislation that specifically targets individuals
with mental illness in solitary confinement.273 Although the remaining
two address solitary confinement conditions in general, the provided
recommendations can easily be adapted to meet the needs of individuals
with mental illness. 274 Below, all three solutions are described and
the tenets are enumerated. 275 Additionally, recommendations are
that the tenets apply specifically to individuals with
offered to ensure
276
mental illness.
A.

Solitary Confinement Study and Reform Act

In May 2014, Representative Cedric Richmond introduced the
Solitary Confinement Act to Congress.277 Considering the lack of
uniformity in the way in which solitary confinement is used across
the country, coupled with the constitutional concerns, Representative

court by means of affected parties with standing, on grounds that it exceeds presidential
authority or deviates from congressional intent.
Id; see, e.g., id at 403-06 (commenting on the way in which President Obama revoked and
amended various executive orders from prior presidents during his early days in office); Michele
Estrin Gilman, If at First You Don 't Succeed, Sign an Executive Order: President Bush and the
Expansion of CharitableChoice, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1103, 1123-24 (2007) (elucidating
the way in which Clinton reversed Reagan's "gag rule" executive order, later reinstated by Bush).
270. See infra Part IV.A-C.
271. Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supranote 41, 75 ("The use of solitary confinement can
be accepted only in circumstances where its duration must be as short as possible and for a definite
term that is properly announced and communicated.").
272. See infra Part IV.A-C.
273. See infra Part V.B.
274. See infra notes 283, 303-06 and accompanying text.
275. See infra Part IV.A-C.
276. See infra Part IV.A-C.
277. Richmond, supra note 197, at 13.
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Richmond proposed the Solitary Confinement Act to legislate change.278
The Act's purposes are as follows:
(1) [D]evelop and implement national standards for the use of solitary
confinement to ensure that it is used infrequently and under extreme
circumstances; (2) establish a more humane and constitutionally sound
practice of segregated detention or solitary confinement in the Nation's
prisons; (3) accelerate the development of best practices and make
reforming solitary confinement a top priority in each prison, jail, and
juvenile detention system at the Federal and State levels; (4) increase
the available data and information on the incidence of solitary
confinement consequently improving the management and
administration of correctional and juvenile justice facilities; (5)
standardize definitions used for collecting data on the incidence of
solitary confinement; (6) increase the accountability of prison, jail, and
juvenile corrections officials who fail to design and implement humane
and constitutionally sound solitary confinement practices; (7) protect
the Eighth Amendment rights of Federal, State, and local prisoners and
juvenile detainees;
and (8) reduce
costs that solitary confinement
•
279
imposes on interstate commerce.
Further, the Solitary Confinement Act establishes a commission to study
solitary confinement's conditions, prevalence, and effects in U.S. prisons
and jails and to develop national standards. 280 The Solitary Confinement
Act was not passed, but it was reintroduced in 2015.281
If Congress does not pass the Solitary Confinement Act, which
applies to all incarcerated persons, it should enact similar legislation that
applies specifically to incarcerated individuals with mental illness in
federal prisons.282 As a result, to best protect individuals with mental
illness, the following variations are recommended:
(1) [D]evelop and implement national standards for the use of solitary
confinement with individuals with mental illness to ensure that it is

used infrequently and under extreme circumstances; (2) establish a
more humane and constitutionally sound practice of segregated
278. Id. ("The bill aims to study and promote reforms to how solitary confinement is done in
America and to bring the practice more in line with the U.S. Constitution."). Additionally,
Richmond notes that "[w]e have to respect the challenges of housing the nation's offenders, but we
must make sure the systems that prison officials have in place are humane." Id. at 15.
279. Solitary Confinement Study and Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 4618, 113th Cong. § 2(1)-(8)
(2014).

280. Id. §§ 3-4.
281. Solitary Confinement Study and Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 3399, 114th Cong. § 1 (2015);
see H.R. 4618-Solitary Confinement Study and Reform Act of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/4618/all-actions?overview-closed (last visited Nov. 26,
2016).
282. See infra text accompanying note 283.
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detention or solitary confinement for individuals with mental illness in
the Nation's prisons; (3) accelerate the development of best practices
and make reforming solitary confinement for individuals with mental
illness a top priority in each prison, jail, and juvenile detention system
at the Federal and State levels; (4) increase the available data and
information on the incidence of solitary confinement with individuals
with mental illness consequently improving the management and
administration of correctional and juvenile justice facilities; (5)
standardize definitions used for collecting data on the incidence of
solitary confinement with individuals with mental illness; (6) increase
the accountability of prison, jail, and juvenile corrections officials who
fail to design and implement humane and constitutionally sound
solitary confinement practices for individuals with mental illness; (7)
protect the Eighth Amendment rights of Federal, State, and local
prisoners and juvenile detainees with mental illness; and (8) reduce
individuals with mental illness
costs that solitary confinement 2with
83
imposes on interstate commerce.
As mentioned, the legislation should establish a commission to
study solitary confinement's conditions, prevalence, and effects in U.S.
prisons and jails, but specifically with respect to individuals with mental
illness, and also develop national standards to guide its limited use with
this population.2 84 Considering the prevalence of mental illness in
prisons and its disproportionate prevalence in solitary confinement,28 5
the proposal, which slightly alters the Solitary Confinement Act, both
captures the extent of the problem and puts practices in place to better
treat incarcerated individuals with mental illness.286
B.

New York's Secure Housing Unit Exclusion Law

In 2011, New York became the first state to enact legislation to
change the prison conditions for individuals with mental illness. 287 The
SHU Exclusion Law limits the use of solitary confinement by
prohibiting its use on individuals with serious mental illness.288 Under
this statute, serious mental illness includes some of the following
diagnoses or observations: schizophrenia, delusional disorder, major
depressive disorders, bipolar disorder I and II, active suicidal ideations
283. See supra text accompanying note 279 (mirroring the Solitary Confinement Act but
making it applicable specifically to individuals with mental illness).
284. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., text accompanying note 98.
286. See supra notes 80-82, 283 and accompanying text.
287. Phyllis Vine, Solitary Confinement Reformed in New York, MIWATCH.ORG, http://www.
miwatch.org/2011/07/solitaryconfinementreformed.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
288. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137(6)(d)(i) (McKinney 2012).
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or recent suicidal attempts, and significant mental deterioration while in
solitary confinement.2 89 Moreover, some of the law's tenets include (1)
transferring individuals with mental illness out of solitary confinement
and into therapeutic settings; 290 (2) establishing a procedure specifying
the frequency in which mental health screening is conducted on
individuals in solitary confinement;291(3) incorporating a mental health
clinician's mental health assessment and determinations upon deciding
when to terminate the solitary confinement sentence; 292 and (4)
prohibiting a restricted diet, unless otherwise required, for individuals in
solitary confinement with mental illness.293 Because this law aims to
cater an individual's treatment while incarcerated to their mental health
needs, this legislation is a progressive step in the right direction, a
framework Congress should consider enacting, and should be a model
for similar state legislation. To maximize the way in which it protects
individuals with mental illness in federal prisons, the following
variations should be added to the above tenets: (1) require that
individuals completing the mental health screenings are adequately
trained294 and (2) include the above protections not only to individuals
who have active mental illness but also to individuals who have an acute
history of mental illness.2 95
C. Peoples v. Fischer Settlement Agreement
After spending 780 days in solitary confinement for a non-violent
offense, Leroy Peoples brought an action, individually and on behalf of
similarly situated individuals, against the New York State Department of
Corrections and Communities Services ("NY DOCCS") Commissioner
Brian Fischer for the disproportionate and unconstitutional use of
solitary confinement.2 96 The complaint alleged that "New York... uses
289. Id. § 137(6)(e)(i).
290. Id.§ 137(6)(1)(d)(i).
291. Id. § 137(6)(d)(ii)(A)-(C).
292. Id.§ 137(6)(d)(ii)(D).
293. Id. § 137(6)(d)(iv).
294. But cf supra note 105 and accompanying text (ensuring that individuals completing the
screening are trained to work effectively with this population).
295. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (articulating the way in which solitary
confinement not only exacerbates mental illness with individuals who are mentally ill but also can
create mental illness in otherwise mentally stable individuals). By including individuals with an
acute history, the law will ensure that individuals that may have difficulty communicating their
symptoms are equally protected. See supra notes 106-08, 113-14 and accompanying text.
296. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 1-4, Peoples v. Fischer, No. 11-CV-2694
(SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013), ECF No. 93; Historic Settlement Overhauls Solitary Confinement
in New York, NYCLU (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.nyclu.org/news/historic-settlement-overhaulssolitary-confinement-new-york.
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extreme isolation as a disciplinary tool of first resort with astonishing
frequency and length for the violation of any one of over one hundred
internal prison regulations. 2 97 The complaint further alleged that once
sentenced to solitary confinement, the NY DOCCS failed to conduct
any periodic review to assess whether solitary confinement was
still warranted.29 8
In an interim settlement agreement, in 2014, the petitioner agreed to
discontinue the action, provided that the NY DOCCS revamped its
solitary confinement practices. 299 As enumerated in the agreement, the
NY DOCCS agreed to develop a system that would ensure the time
sentenced in solitary confinement is proportional to the infraction and to
cease using solitary confinement with pregnant women, juveniles, and
individuals with developmental disabilities.3 00 In 2015, the parties
finalized their agreement.30 1 Pursuant to the agreement, the NY DOCCS
will (1) reduce the number of violations punishable by solitary
confinement; (2) implement maximum sentences on offenses-thirty
days for most first-time, non-violent offenses and a three-month
maximum sentence of solitary confinement for most other offenses; (3)
ensure basic human needs are met for individuals in solitary
confinement, including adequate meals and phone privileges; and (4)
provide training for correctional officers in which they would learn
techniques to reduce the need to use solitary confinement. 30 2 Mirroring
these tenets, Congress should enact legislation that requires all federal
correctional facilities to follow suit. To best assist individuals with
mental illness, however, this Note proposes that the following variations
be adopted: (1) violations that result due to symptoms of mental illness
are not punishable with solitary confinement; 30 3 (2) if an individual
exhibits symptoms of mental illness while in solitary confinement, such
sentence should be terminated;30 4 (3) basic needs include regular mental
297. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 296, at 11, 14 (noting that some of the infractions
that may result in solitary confinement include an untidy cell, littering, unauthorized jewelry, or an
unreported illness).
298. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 296, at 16.
299. See Stipulation for a Stay with Conditions, supranote 228, at 2-4.
300. See id. at 3-4.
301.

See HistoricSettlement Overhauls Solitary Confinement in New York, supranote 296.

302. Id.
303. But cf supra note 114 and accompanying text (ensuring that individuals who, due to
mental illness, are less able to conform to prison rules are not being punished for exhibiting
symptoms of mental illness). Additionally, this modification would ensure that the prisons and jails
are treating individuals with mental illness in accordance with the ADA, which provides that mental
illness is a disability and unjustified and an intentional isolation of a person with mental illness
constitutes discrimination. See supranote 153 and accompanying text.
304. But cf supra text accompanying note 119 (ensuring that individuals removed from
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health treatment, medication, and monitoring; 30 5 and (4) training for
correctional officers to differentiate between an individual acting out and
an individual exhibiting symptoms of mental illness.30 6
V.

CONCLUSION

Notably, "near-total isolation exact[s] a terrible price, 30 7 and that
price is even greater for individuals with mental illness. 30 8 In 2010,
sixteen-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for crimes that he did not
commit. 30 9 Following lengthy court delays and postponements, Browder
was finally released from pretrial detention three years later.310 In the
general population, Browder was subjected to a prison environment that
a DOJ investigation found to have a "deep-seated culture of violence,"
riddled with attacks from officers and other incarcerated persons.311
Furthermore, the investigation found incarcerated persons sustained
injuries that included "broken jaws, broken orbital bones, broken noses,
long bone fractures, and lacerations requiring [stitches]. 312 Despite
this environment, solitary c6nfinement proved to be more detrimental
to Browder.3 13
As prison populations increased and the number of communitybased mental health facilities decreased, the prevalence of mental illness
in prisons began to rise.314 Moreover, as the number of individuals in
prison with mental illness began to rise, while the number of mental
health professionals working in prisons declined, the number of
infractions resulting in solitary confinement soared among individuals
with mental illness.315 Dr. Stuart Grassian noted that "[t]he restriction
of environmental stimulation and social isolation associated with
confinement in solitary are strikingly toxic to mental function., 316 As
solitary confinement because of mental health deterioration are not returned to solitary confinement
where the individual may suffer another relapse).
305. But cf supra note 110 and accompanying text (ensuring that individuals sentenced to
solitary confinement are assessed periodically for mental illness and treated accordingly, including
both individuals who were screened positive and negative for mental illness during the initial
assessment).
306. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
307. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
308. See supra Part ll.B.
309. Gonnerman, supra note 1.
310. Id.
311.

U.S. ATT'Y FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., supranote 14, at 3.

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id.
Gonnerman, supra note 13.
See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 80-82, 95-98 and accompanying text.
Grassian, supra note 43, at 354.
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a result, it is no surprise that there is a higher prevalence of suicide
rates between individuals in solitary confinement than individuals in
the general population. 31 7 Solitary confinement's long-term effects
are particularly damaging. 318 These effects, however, are even
more damaging to a population already vulnerable due to existing
mental illness.319
As the Supreme Court has noted, "[r]unning a prison is an
inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and
the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the
province of the legislative and executive branches of government." 320 As
a result, the courts are required to balance the individual's rights against
a prison's administrative needs. 32' Settlement agreements, federal
statutes, and judicial decisions aim to protect individuals with mental
illness in the prison system, while balancing the prison's competing
needs.322 Despite these laws, individuals with mental illness continue to
be significantly harmed by solitary confinement making it clear that
these laws are inadequate.323 Therefore, Congress should enact
legislation to adequately address this issue.324 The Solitary Confinement
Act, New York's SHU Exclusion Law, and the Peoples v. Fischer
settlement agreement all provide tenets that could be implemented to
better protect individuals with mental illness in solitary confinement.325
Jails and prisons previously shared the same design as zoos, but
when "it became clear that animals restricted to such living conditions
exhibited behavioral abnormalities or simply died," zoos changed how it
housed its animals.326 Prisons and jails, however, have yet to follow
suit, continuing to house people in a manner that is substandard to
animals. 327 Arguably, "[t]he laws and practices that have established
and perpetuated this tragedy deeply offend any sense of human

317.
318.
319.
320.

Goode, supranote 115.
See Grassian, supra note 43, at 335-36.
See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm'n v. id. Dep't of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317-TWP-

MID, 2012 WL 6738517, at *25 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
84-85 (1987)).
321. See supra Part Im.C.
322. See supra Part II.C-D.
323. See supranotes 115-23 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part IV.
325. See supra Part TV.
326. GILLIGAN & LEE, supra note 14, at 17 ("Thus we now allow animals to be kept only in
'zoological parks' designed to recreate the kinds of environments that they had evolved to survive
in.").

327. Id. ("But when it comes to human beings, we house them in physical environments in the
likes in which no zoo director would be permitted to place wild animals.").
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decency., 328 It is time Congress enacts federal legislation to ensure
that humans, particularly individuals with mental illness, who are
incarcerated no longer fall subject to confinement conditions deemed
unsuitable for zoo animals. 329 History, research, and sadly Kalief
Browder, continue to demonstrate solitary confinement's grave effects
on individuals with mental illness. 330 Failing to reform the way solitary
confinement is used on individuals with mental illness leaves an already
vulnerable population-who the government has a duty to protect while
incarcerated 33 1-susceptible to increased harm and exposed to fatal and
irreversible consequences. 332
Melanie Campbell*

328. Grassian, supranote 43, at 355.
329. Compare supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (describing solitary confinement's
conditions), with supra note 326 and accompanying text (describing the conditions that are
unsuitable for animals in zoos).
330. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text (describing Kalief Browder's experience
with solitary confinement); supra Part lI.A (describing solitary confinement's history); supra Part
I.B (describing the research on solitary confinement).
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332. See, e.g., supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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